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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAN C. WORRALL,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 16375

vs.
OGDEN CITY FIRE
DEPARTMENT & OGDEN
CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Defendants/Respondents.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Dan Worrall appeals from a judgment rendered
against him and in favor of the defendant by the Second Judicial
Court, Weber County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On October 31, 1978, trial was held in the Second Judicial

Court of Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable John F.
Wahlquist, Judge, sitting without a jury, presiding.

Following

a hearing in which witnesses were called, counsel for appellant
and respondents submitted briefs to the Court, and on November
30, 1978, the Court ruled that the plaintiff had not met the
burden of proof in establishing that Ogden City's fire departmental
Order #160 had no rational or reasonable relationship to a bona
fide public purpose, and also, that the Ogden City Civil Service
Rule requiring that an appeal of a departmental removal to the
Civil Service Board must be filed within 5 days was valid, that
plaintiff did not file his appeal within that time, plaintiff
11as not entitled to the trial afforded him by the Court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Court's Order remanding
the case for hearing by the Ogden City Civil Service Corrnnission,
and if necessary, a new trial and eventual reinstatement as an
Ogden City fireman.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 29, 1976, Charles J. Hansen, Chief of the
Ogden City Fire Department, signed a letter to Fireman Second
Class, Dan C. Worrall, giving him official notice that his
employment with the Ogden City Fire Department was terminated
as of November 28, 1976, due to his refusal to comply with
General Order 160, relating to the wearing of moustaches by
Ogden Citv firemen.
part).

The Order reads as follows:

(In pertinent

"to provide the best possible safety conditions, both

from flas'h fire and respiratory aspects and to project the
best possible public image of his uniform and Fire Department.
The following rules will be in effect immediately .... For
moustaches:

Moustaches will not extend beyond the lower part

of the upper lip nor will any part of the moustache be more
than one-half inch in length."

Worrall wore a handle-bar type

moustache, neatly trirrnned, which extended below the upper lip.
(T-13).

The notice to fireman Worrall included no reference

to any procedure available to him for further review or appeal
of the chief's decision, or the time period in which an appeal
should be taken.

(T-10).

On December 29, one month later,

the appellant by and through his attorney, C. Gerald Parker,
filed a Notice of Appeal with the Ogden City Manager and a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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further notice with the Ogden City Civil Service Commission.
On January 12, 1977, R. L. Larsen, Ogden City Manager, advised
counsel for fireman Worrall that his appeal to the City Manager
was denied because it was not filed within 5 days following
appellant's discharge.

On January 26, 1977, appellant and his

attorney appeared before the Ogden City Civil Service Commission
to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as not
being timely under Section 10-10-21, Utah Code Annotated (1953),
and under the rules and regulations of the Ogden City Civil
Service Commission.
question,, to-wit:

Said hearing was limited to only one
Whether the appeal should not be dismissed

as not having been filed timely.

On March 9, 1977, the Ogden

City Civil Service Commission denied appellant's appeal on the
basis that it had not been filed in a timely manner.

The Civil

Service Commission was advised at that time by Ogden City
Corporation counsel, Timothy Blackburn, that the Civil Service
Commission need not concern themselves with the problems
raised by Mr. Worrall's grievance and did not need to consider
the effect of their denial based on the 5 day limitation because
Worrall would have a
this dispute.

re~edy

at law through the Court to resolve

See Memorandum filed by defendant in support of

Motion for Summary Judgment.

On June 23, 1977, appellant filed

suit against the respondent in the District Court.

At the

beginning of the trial on October 31, 1978, defendant moved for
Sunnnary Judgment on the basis that appellant was not properly
before the Court, as his appeal to the Civil Service Commission
'0

as not timely filed.

The Court took the matter under advisement
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but allowed the trial to proceed.

(T-1).

The evidence adduced

at trial demonstrated that appellant had worn a handle-bar
moustache for approximately 8 years prior to 1976, while an
employee of the Ogden City Fire

Depart~ent.

That he had kept

it neat and well trimmed and had never had any difficulty in
fighting fires,

in sealing his face masks, or having his facial

hair catch on fire.

(T-5).

Rule 160 was promulgated by the

Chief of the Ogden City Fire Department in 1976, and appellant
irranediately voiced his concern to the chief, indicating he
felt his moustache was attractive, was a part of his personality
and personal appearance, and did not interfere with his work as
a fireman.

(T-4).

That at no time was a determination ever

made that appellant's particular moustache had ever interferred
with his safety or the safety of others.

The chief's principal

concern seemed to be with the image of firemen and the effect
of Worrall's continued wearing of a handle-bar moustache would
have on that image.

(T-50-51).

Evidence was further produced

by other firemen indicating that there were no health or safety
prohl0ms with the wearine of a moustache,

(T-24, T-33), althour,h,

some individuals felt there could be a problem with the scaling
of f?ce masks in fighting a fire with certain facial hair, and
that this was the reason for the promulgation of the rule,
(T-53).

Evidence was also adduced that indicated that other

individuals were also in violation of Rule 160, but were not
disciplined as was the appellant,

(T-10, T-27, T-33).

The trial

Judge, in evaluating the evidence, determined that the appellant
had not met his burden of a proponderance of the evidence in
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showing that the regulation had no rational basis or reasonable relationship to a bona fide public purpose, and therefore,
the order was presumed valid.

The Judge also ruled that the

trial of this matter should never, in effect, have taken place,
in that the failure of the appellant to perfect his appeal
within 5 days to the Ogden City Civil Service Commission voided
any further proceedings, and that had the city's Motion for
Summary Judgment been filed timely, Judgnent would have been
granted and the matter would have never proceeded to trial.
The Judge made no ruling regarding appellant's equal protection
argument, in that others were not treated and disciplined as he
was for a violation of the rule.

On December 18, 1978, appellant

filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, challenging the Court's ruling on
the basis that it did not address the appellant's equal
protection argument, and also in ruling as a matter of law, that
appellant's claim was barred for failing to file a claim within
the 5 day appeal period.

Appellant's motion was heard on

February 13, 1979, and the Judge denied the motion for the same
reasons enunciated in the original findings.

From that denial

plaintiff appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT PROPERLY
APPEALED TO THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE TIME AND
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL AND REMANDED THE CASE BACK TO ··

.. '
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THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.
In reviewing the Trial Judge's decision in this case,
this Court, must of necessity, grapple with Section 10-10-21,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), which concerns the time limits for
appeals from administrative decisions, and more particularly,
serves as the basis for the time period established by the
Ogden City Civil Service Commission, in which an employee of
the Ogden City Fire Department, who is terminated, must appeal
that decision to the City Kanager or the Ogden City Civil
Service Commission.

The predecesor of Section 10-10-21 was

Section 15-9-21, Utah Code Ann. (1943), which is an identical
statute, and which this Court considered in Vetterli v. Civil
Service Commission of Salt Lake City, 145 P. 2d 792 (1944).
In this case a Salt Lake City police officer left the State of
Utah and failed to report for duty on the morning of June 1,
1941.

On June 3, 1941, the Chief of Police wrote a letter to

the City Commission and sent a copy to the Civil Service
Commission in which he stated, "That the officer in question was
dismissed from service, effective May 31, 1941."

The officer

in question learned of the discharge prior to June 11, 1941, and
on June 30, 1941, he filed an appeal with the Civil Service
Commission.

The appeal was clearly not filed within the 5 day

period required by the provisions of the code.

In spite of this,

the Civil Service Commission heard the appeal over the objections
of the Police Chief that the appeal had not been perfected with~
the time allowed by law and that the commission was without
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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jurisdiction.

The decision of the Civil Service Cormnission

was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which did not over-rule
the Civil Service Corrrrnission's decision to hear the case even
though the 5 day appeal period had expired.

Thus, it is clear

that this Court does not intend that the limitation periods
prescribed by statute be so rigid that no exceptions can be
made in reasonable cases.

There are many other cases in the

United States holding that when there has not been such a
lengthy period of time between the time of discharge of a public
employee and his reinstatement as to prejudice the employing
department, then a reasonable delay in seeking reinstatement
will not be a bar thereto.

The Court should note 145 ALR 773

as follows:
"Generally, it must be shown that prejudice
to the appointing power has resulted in
order to make their delay a bar to an
action by a discharged public employee
for reinstatement.
Thus, it has been said
in a case of this kind that if, because of
his delay in seeking his remedy without
offering a satisfactory explanation for the
delay, prejudice results to his adversary,
one will be precluded from enforcing his
demand.
It is not so much a question of
the lapse of time as it is to determine
whether prejudice has resulted.
If the
delay has caused no material change in
statu quo ante, that is no detriment
suffered by the party pleading the latches,
his plea is in vain."
There has never been any evidence in the instant case showing
that Ogden City or the fire department was in any way prejudiced
by defendant's actions.

In fact, no prejudice has resulted, the

only one who has been damaged is the appellant himself, as he
has been unable to work as a fireman, a vocation which he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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followed for eight years, for a period of three years.

The

entire problem with this case essentially rests with the
Civil Service Commission's initial decision not to hear }1r.
Worrall' s Complaint.

It should be carefully noted

t~1at

Mr.

Worrall did file a Notice of Appeal 30 days after he was fired.
This Court is well aware that this is a normal period for filing
appeals in most judicial matters.

All of the individuals

required to be present for the Civil Service Commission to make
a decision, to-wit; the fire chief, firemen, other experts,
etc., could have been present at any of the Civil Service
Commission hearings in December, 1976, or January, and March
of 1977, when the decision was being made.

They were all

present at the trial which took place in October, 1978, almost
two years later.

Therefore, it is difficult to understand how

the city was or could have been prejudiced by the Civil Service
Cormnission reviewing Mr. Worrall's case.

The unfortunate problem

is that this is the type of matter which should be resolved at
the administrative hearing level, not one which should be tried
in the District Court and now be reviewed by this Court.

Had

a hearing on the merits been granted by the Civil Service
Commission, the case may never have reached this level as it
undoubtedly would have been ascertained that Mr. Worrall's
moustache, while not directly complying with the order, was
not interferring with his duty as a fireman, was not creating
a hazard, and therefore, some exception or compromise, as is
allowable in administrative proceedings could have been reached~
This Court is now faced with the dubious task some three years
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later of substituting its Judgment for that of an administrative
body.

Appellant recognizes the position in which he has placed

this Court, but also recognizes that this Court must, as the
final arbiter of these matters, intervene when justice requires,
to guarantee that fundamental fairness is achieved.
There are other factors which this Court must examine
in reviewing the 5 day statute of limitations in this particular
case.

One concerns notice.

The facts are abundantly clear.

At the time Chief Hansen fired the appellant, no notice was
given to appellant, that he must appeal the chief's decision
within 5 days.

Some vague reference was made during the course

of the trial, that the 5 day appeal provision is contained within
a handbook of rules and regulations passed out to all employees
by the department, but clearly, on the termination letter, no
notice was given to appellant of the requirement that the appeal
must be filed within 5 days.

Appellant was not trained as a

lawyer and was not represented by legal counsel at the time the
termination notice was issued on November 29.

He was not aware

that any further review action or appellant procedure must be
filed within 5 days.

Due process of law requires that appellant

should have been advised either as a part of the termination
notice of November 29, or by other suitable means of his right
to a further hearing and the procedure required therefore.
This requirement is set forth in the Utah case of Entre Nous
Club v. Toronoto, 287 P. 2d 670 (1955), wherein this Court
stated as follows:
"\.Jhile hearings before administrative
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bodies need not have all the formality
of a judicial procedure, but may be
infonnal and if suited to the matter
involved, rather summary ... If there
are certain elements of fair play
required by the constitution which
are necessary in any character of hearing affecting personal or property
rights.
In respect to hearings before
administrative bodies (as well as
judicial tribunals), those elements
include (1) a reasonable time and place
for hearing where interested parties may
attent with effort.
(2) Reasonable
notice to interested parties, and (3)
reasonable opportunities for presentation
of such evidence and argument as are
appropriate to the proceedings."
The right of a civil service employee to be notified of his
right to appear before the commission is further set forth in
15 Am Jur 2d, Section 40, wherein it is explained that when a
governmental agency is seeking to discharge a veteran who is a
men:ber of the classified civil service, the veteran "has the
right to personally be present to present his side of the case
to the appropriate official of the agency, and not being notified
of his ri 0 ht of personal appearance at the agency level, he must
take such action that will constitute a clear assertion of his
right or it will be waived."

In the instant case, fireman

Worrall was entitled to be notified of his right of personal
appearance at the agency level.

There are numerous examples

in administrative law of advising an individual of his rights
of review and appeal from the decision of a governmental agency.
When a person receives his property tax assessment, he is cle:irly
informed in writing that if he does not agree to the determinatic:
of valuation made by the assessor, he has the right to appear oo
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c:

a certain date and state his objections to appeal the assessment.
Likewise, when a person's income tax return is audited and
additional taxes are levied, a notice of deficiency clearly
sPts forth the date by which additional steps for review must
be taken and the exact procedure involved.

In the area of

workman's compensation at the state level, social security
disability at the federal level and other administrative
hearings, the claimants are notified at every stage of the
proceedings at such time as decisions are made, that the
decisions may be appealed and the time frame in which the
appeal must be taken.

Recently, this Court has spoken clearly

regarding the effect of notifying an individual before a
statutory period of limitation can run.

The case is Rose Marie

Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, #15634, filed January
10, 1979, in which Justice Wilkins, writing for the majority,

stated as follows:

"Similarly, where a defendant has only 5

days to appeal, it is particularly important and due process
requires that notice of the Judgment be given to defendant of
his right to appeal, or his right to appeal is abridged severely.
Despite the fact that Section 78-6-10 does not provide that
notice must be given a defendant in a Small Claims Court action,
we hold that Rule 73a applies to procedure in that Court as in
other City Courts, and the time for appeal from the Court
commences from Notice of Judgment."

This was a case in which

Default Judgment was taken in a Small Claims Court.
defendant was not notified of the Judgment.

The

The Judgment was

rlricketed and filed and the 5 day appeal time ran before defendant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

discovered that the appeal had been taken.

Justice Wilkin's

primary concern is that notice to the party is the critical
requirement when evaluating whether a statute of limitations
has tolled, no matter how short.

Appellant concedes that a

5 day statute is not in and of itself arbitrary and capricious
and unconstitutional, as this Court has ruled in Larsen Ford v.
Silver Utah, 551 P. 2d 133 (1976).

It is clear, however, that

when statutes of limitation are of short duration that this
Court will carefully review the circumstances surrounding the
failure to comply with the statute by the aggrieved party.

In

this case, the city has, from the moment this dispute arose,
attempted to use the 5 day appeals statute as a complete bar and
has succeeded in blocking Mr. Worrall from any effec\::ive review
of his case at the level where it should have been reviewed, the
Civil Service Commission.
The entire intent of civil service laws which involve
employee-employer relations is to bring the largest

~umber

of

employees within the operation of the law and, thus, should be
construed liberally to obtain that goal.

The purpose of Civil

Service Review Boards and administrative hearines is not to deny
or to unduly prejudice claimants who have legitimate grievances,
but to open the door for them and to remove this burden from the
courts.
process.

The city's actions have completely frustrated this
The Court should note 15 Am Jur 2d, p. 473, which state:

"The purpose of the civil service law being to secure effective
public service, the widest range is given to the application
which should be liberally construed to bring employees within
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its operation unless a clear exclusion is manifested by specific
listing of the unclassified positions. 11
The failure of the Civil Service Counnission to allow
the appellant to fully present the merits of his case at that
level has had a detrimental effect on all proceedings subsequent
thereto.

Under normal circumstances had the trial Court been

faced, as it should have been, with a review of the Civil
Service Commission's findings, the issue would have been clearly
defined, to-wit:

Did the commission act arbitrarily and

capriciously in either sustaining or reversing the departmental
action.

Unfortunately the commission was not allowed and did

not act on the merits of the case.

The Court was thus faced

with a confusing situation and allowed the case to proceed to
trial, but then ruled that the case should have never been tried
as the appeal was not properly perfected.

Appellant believes

strongly that the Judge's ruling on the 5 day appeal procedure
casts doubt upon his consideration of the evidence in the case
as the trier of fact.

The most reasonable interpretation of

the Judge's ruling is that the Court is saying to the appellant,
"I am not impressed with the evidence you presented, in that it
does not sustain your position, but even if I was, you shouldn't
be here anyway because your case is procedurally deficient and,
therefore, I should never have had to consider the evidence in
the first place. 11

Obviously, this Court should be concerned with

that reasoning.
The Judge had the duty, at the beginning of the trial
after a review of the pleadings at that time to sua espoute,
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remand the case back to the Civil Service Commission and
direct that a full hearing be held before judicial review
of the case could take place.

In the absence of the Court

taking affirmative action in that regard, the effect of the
Court's decision to proceed with the trial was to allow an
evidentiary hearing as a trial de novo, at which the specter
of a dismissal on procedural grounds was present throughout
and which finally compelled the Court to rule thereon almost
as an afterthought to the main decision.

Thus, the Court

erred in not remanding the case for a full hearing at the
Civil Service Commission, compounded the error by allowing
the trial to proceed even though a motion had been made for
Summary Judgment based upon a procedural deficiency, and
completed the error by ruling as a matter of law after the
presentation of evidence, that appellant should
afforded a trial.

neve~

have been

Such a scenario demands a reversal and a

remand for a complete evidentiary hearing by the Civil Service
Board.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON
THE BASIS THAT THE COURT DID NOT CONSIDER
EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
APPLICATION OF RULE 160 AGAINST THE
APPELLANT AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAW GUARANTEED BY THE 14TH AMENDMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The Trial Court's Memorandum Decision in the inst<mt

.

case considered only two issues raised by appellant's ca,e.
The first which was discussed in Point I infra concerned the 5
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day statute of limitations.

The second, concerned the Court's

ruling that the appellant did not present sufficient evidence
to meet the preponderance test that Rule 160 had no rational
public purpose and, therefore, should not be enforced against
him.

Unfortunately, the Court ignored in its ruling, the other

issue raised by appellant, which was presented at trial concerning
whether Rule 160 was being enforced equally and fairly throughout
the Ogden City Fire Department.

Appellant concedes that this

issue was not specifically raised in initial pleadings, but in
subsequent Interrogatories and at the trial, the issue was clearly
set forth in the evidence that was presented.

There was uncontested

evidence that at least two other firemen were in violation of
Rule 160.
Maltby.

These individuals were Clem Merrill and Lt. Todd
Maltby testified at the trial and indicated that not

only were these two individuals in violation of the order, but
many others were also in violation and, that although, they
initially failed to comply with the order, no action was taken
against them until after the appellant had challenged the fire
department and Ogden City on the issue.
such action was taken against them.

Prior to that time, no

No temporary suspensions were

issued and they were not dismissed as was the appellant.

No action

was taken until 1977, subsequent to appellant challenging the
department on the issue of the moustache.

Evidence further

established that some firemen are still not in compliance with
Rule 160 and no disciplinary action has been taken (T-33).

It

is clear from the evidence that the appellant was for some reason
,ingled out.

Although he had been an excellent employee and there

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

had never been any difficulty with the moustache, because of
its appearance, and because of appellant's desire to keep the
moustache, he was "made an example."

Again, this is a matter

that should have been reviewed by the Civil Service Commission
so that this Court would not be burdened with having to review
it here.

Unfortunately, because of the city's misguided and

rigid adherence to the 5 day statute, the Court must now consider
whether or not appellant was denied equal protection of the law.
The record is clear and the evidence was uncontroverted at trial
that arbitrariness in enforcing Rule 160 existed, yet the Judge
remained strangely silent on that aspect of the case in his ruling.
The silence was called to his attention in the Motion for a New
Trial, but the Court refused to consider the issue and did not
address it in the ruling on that Motion.

Appellant's contention

is that the Judge clearly erred in not addressing this issue in
the Memorandum Decision, and when requested to address it in the
Motion for a New Trial, further erred in not considering the

tr~l

testimony or reopening the case to further explore the evidence.
The Judge's failure again demonstrates that the focus of the
Court drifted from the facts to the procedural problems of the
5 day notice, and once the Court determined that the case was
not properly before it, all other issues were swept away.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court re-examine the
record as it will find uncontested evidence of violations of the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment and, therefore,
the case should be remanded so that issue can be appropriately
considered for the trier of fact.
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CONCLUSION
Rigid adherence to short duration statutes of limitation
has never been favored by this Court in the interest of justice.
The facts of each individual case are always carefully considered
when determining if a statute of limitation should act as a bar
to legal redress.

Appellant's case cries out to be redressed.

This Court now has the opportunity to say to the respondents,
Ogden City, and Ogden City Fire Department, that administrative
procedures are there, not only to protect the administrative
agency, but to allow a legitimate grievance to be fully and
completely explored and analyzed before the judicial system
becomes involved.

Appellant met the intent of the law in filing

his appeal when he did and presenting and proceeding with his
case expeditiously.
except to himself.

No prejudice resulted from any of his actions
The Trial Court should have observed this in

the proceedings and should have remanded the case for a full
hearing at the administrative level.

The Trial Court erred further

in allowing the trial to proceed and then ruling as a matter of
law that the trial should not have taken place.

The error was

compounded when the Court ignored uncontested evidence of failure
to provide equal protection of the laws in the enforcement of
Rule 160, by the respondents.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the decision of the District Court and remand the case to the
Ogden City Civil Service Commission for further proceedings with
the direction that the entire matter be heard by them on the merits
so

that subsequent, judicial proceedings, if necessary, may be
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based upon adequate administrative reviewt
Respectfully submitted this

,,hL~ay of July, 1979.
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